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Reviews and Discussion 
Paul Bouissac. Circus and Culture: A Semiotic Approach. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976. 
Reviewed by Jean Alter 
University of Pennsylvania 
Is drcus a form of communication? Does it offer a mes-
sage on top of entertainment? Is it a language? Does it 
use one or several semiotic codes which are decoded by 
the audience? Is it possible to insert the circus, as a 
system of signs, in the larger networ-k of signs which de-
fine our culture? Paul Bouissac answers all these ques-
tions with a resounding YES, then expands his answer in 
an extraordinary collection of essays, which despite 
some disparity, manage to add up to an integrated whole. 
In fact, they are arranged like individual circus acts in the 
circus program: each deals with a different area-
acrobats, "comedy horse," jugglers and magicians, lions 
and tigers, wild horses, clowns-but all have a common 
message, to wit: circus must be approached semiotically. 
And just as circus acts form a harmonious and stable 
pattern, so the various approaches used by Bouissac 
under the umbrella of semiotics complement each other 
quite convincingly. 
The entire book must then be judged on two levels. 
Does it tell us something interesting and/or new about the 
circus? And does it expand our appreciation of semiotics 
as a tool for the analysis of cultural phenomena which, 
like the circus, stress a public performance? There is 
little doubt about the first question. Bouissac's es$ays 
have been hailed as the first significant breakthrough in 
what used to be only a descriptive and historical/ 
anecdotal account of circuses, and this general admira-
tion is well deserved. Bouissac had the experience of 
running a circus himself, as many others had; he has 
been trained in linguistics, anthropology, and struc-
turalism, as have many others; but the combination is 
indeed unique. The average semiotician, when he leaves 
the safe academic fields with which he is familiar, must 
deal with secondhand material and, however brilliant his 
presentation, always risks being countered on factual 
grounds. In Bouissac's case, theory and praxis go to-
gether. As a result, no one, after reading his book, will see 
circus with the same eyes as before. Of course, if one 
liked the "magic" and the "wonder" of the big top, the 
enlightenment provided by Bouissac will result in a feel-
ing of loss. But the passing of the world of make-believe 
is more than compensated for by an initiation to semiotic 
processes underpinning the illusions. An adult can now 
return to the circus in a spirit of eager exploration: to 
check on Bouissac, and perhaps to add to his findings. 
Since circus is a form of communication, Bouissac's 
preferred model is linguistic. In any circus act, and in 
complete programs, he detects the operation of the 
"double articulation," i.e., the use of a finite number of 
signs in a way that generates an infinite number of ~ean­
ings. In that sense, circus is (or has) a language w1th 
multimedia signs of a visual, auditive, and even olfactory 
nature. Separately, they have no fixed meaning, but their 
various combinations produce specific messages. For 
example, the same acrobatic feat performed by an artist 
dressed in a "brightly colored leotard" will classify him as 
a superman and evoke "anxiety and admiration," ulti-
mately referring to "survival through biological superior-
ity," whereas performed by an artist "dressed as a tramp," 
it will provoke "laughter" and refer to "survival through 
chance" (p. 19). Furthermore, like the Russian folktales 
studied by Propp, circus acts and programs have a 
grammar: a stable succession of stages-from the iden-
tification of the performer, through a series of tests, to 
public acknowledgment of his triumph-a pattern which 
may be (purposely) disturbed but eventually goes back 
to its expected progression. Within this pattern, however, 
performers (and/or circus owners/managers) present in-
dividual speech acts which, says Bouissac, are never the 
same except by rare intentionality (p. 23). They address a 
message to the audience, and the fact that it is appre-
ciated, and hence understood, "presupposes that the re-
ceiver shares with the sender a knowledge of a system of 
rules" (p. 14), i.e., a general circus code, made up of 
various subcodes corresponding to types of circus signs: 
linguistic, behavioral, musical, technical, along with 
those involving costumes, lighting, accessories, and so 
on. 
While this general model raises a theoretical question 
(see below), its application to concrete types of acts 
yields unquestionably seminal results, though not always 
of equal interest or equal faithfulness to the model. Thus 
the analysis of acrobatic acts applies mainly to cyber-
netic concepts leading to a kinematic representation of 
transformations. Bouissac follows Ashby on stable equi-
librium, instability, and disturbance, and ends with for-
mulas accounting for ways in which an acrobat creates 
and corrects/controls a disturbance in his state of equi-
librium: a technical notation of a rather obvious slow-
motion description of the act. At this point semiotics 
intervene to qualify the technical behaviors as signifiers 
which (with other surrounding signifiers) relate to 
signified aptitudes for survival. Hence, as mentioned 
above, the real acrobat refers to biological superiority 
and the clown to biological inferiority. All this seems cor-
rect, but hardly new: we always knew that we laughed at 
clowns because they appeared inferior (and often flat on 
the ground) and admired acrobats because they ap-
peared superior (way up there). No need for a semiotic 
approach here. 
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The essay on the performing horse is more revealing 
and controversial. Bouissac says the act contains two 
separate communications, each with its own code: one 
between the trainer and the horse, the other between the 
two performers and the audience. One may ask: does 
animal training, based on the principle of a "conditioned 
reflex" (p. 56), qualify as communication, and does the 
stimulus, with its one-to-one automatic response, qualify 
as a sign? Or even as a "signal"? Can one speak of 
communication without some semiotic intentionality 
and/or consciousness on both sides? If I have con-
ditioned the horse to nod when my hand moves slightly 
toward its ear, do I view my gesture as a sign which the 
horse understands because we share a semiotic code, or 
as a triggering step in a mechanical sequence compara-
ble to turning the key to start a car? A well-trained horse 
has no choice but to give the expected response, but 
interhuman communication always entails a degree of 
uncertainty as to a correct understanding and, a fortiori, 
the resulting response. Of course, one may argue that 
this uncertainty (this choice) only means that we have not 
learned our codes well enough, that, in a perfect society, 
all communication would be conditioned. Perhaps. I sus-
pect that the study of communication, and its very notion, 
would then disappear. Bouissac's description of the con-
ditioning which goes into the horse act is fascinating, but 
really belongs neither with communication nor with cul-
tural semiotics (though perhaps with natural semiotics, 
which study relations between, say, volcano smoke and 
eruption, or thermometer reading and fever). On the other 
hand, if that conditioning were to be assimilated to the 
conditioning of an acrobat or a juggler, and the horse 
viewed as a prop over which the trainer has control, 
Bouissac's 'analysis of the act as communication between 
the performer and the audience would still retain all its 
startling pertinence: we could still receive the message 
that man's superiority over animals can be reversed, es-
pecially when the horse appears to be more intelligent 
than the trainer; and we could still laugh at the latter 
while admiring his skill. 
Not all acts however refer to biological differences. 
Jugglers and magicians, according to Bouissac, subvert 
the Western belief in the manual production of goods, 
since prestidigitation evokes a production without any 
real work, and juggling represents work without any real 
production. This is why, Bouissac says, magicians pro-
duce items related to economic activity (weaving, gar-
dening, animal breeding: handkerchiefs, flowers, rabbits) 
and jugglers juggle useless objects or objects as-
sociated with the leisure class (cigar boxes, bowling 
pins, billiard balls). In turn, the "cat act" (lions, tigers) is 
compared to a text where the "heroes" are modified by 
names, costumes, behavior patterns, and the "villains" by 
their species, size, props. The text is narratively seg-
mented by ritual bows of the tamer, and articulated by a 
poetic structure, which, in its "realistic" style, works with 
metonymy-i.e., danger by contiguity (as when a I ion is 
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forced to jump through an ignited hoop)-and reaches 
"poetry" by the means of metaphors-i.e., anthropomor-
phic similes (as when a lioness kisses the tamer). In still 
another essay, treatment of animals in zoos and circuses 
is differentiated as referring respectively to a mythical 
and ritual attitude; by stressing the ritual uniqueness 
through repetition, circus is said to restore the continuity 
of life. The wild-horses act, through the iconization of 
animals, expresses on the contrary various semantic ten-
sions between social and antisocial behavior, freedom 
and servitude, order and transgression ... and so on. 
The arguments vary, but all point to a deep connection 
between the message of the act and the contextual 
culture. 
The vitality and success of the circus, according to 
Bouissac, do not lie in any "passive enjoyment" but in 
these culturally determined and shared messages. This 
conclusion takes us back to the theoretical question 
raised by Bouissac's model. Indeed, most of his demon-
strations are quite convincing, but rely almost exclusively 
on what I shall call "secondary" circus signs (costumes, 
music, gestures, lights, props), which accompany the 
"primary" sign (technical behavior). Clowns are an ex-
ception to this rule, but then Bouissac himself views the 
clowning act as quite exceptional. In most other cases, 
the message is conveyed by the secondary signs. When 
a dog pushes a baby carriage, he is indeed humanized 
and serves to "restore a biological continuity denied by 
the contextual culture" (p. 121), perhaps evoking laughter. 
But the "primary" interest of the trick lies in the technical 
behavior: a type of walk that dogs normally cannot per-
form (the humanlike erect position is only serendipitous). 
The question is: what about the "primary" sign, if indeed 
it is a sign? Is the technical behavior a form of communi-
cation? Does it convey a message? Or does it satisfy only 
a single need, being consumed in the process? Let us 
compare the enjoyment of a circus act with the enjoyment 
of a gourmet meal served in a restaurant reputed for its 
cuisine. Now, like the circus, gourmet meals also have a 
"double articulation" at work in individual types of dishes 
and the total meal: they too follow a traditional sequence 
(appetizers, fish, meat, etc.) and bring variations to each 
type of dish (there are no two identical Dover soles). 
Furthermore, they also have secondary messages aimed 
at the cultural context (from ethnic values up to patriotic 
allusions and down to low comedy, as with the "cas-
soulet"). And then there are the right and wrong wines, 
with all their literature. In that sense, gourmet meals may 
and should be viewed as a form of communication to be 
studied semiotically (we are applying for a grant). But, in 
the primary sense, the gourmet meal remains an experi-
ence for the mouth, the eye, and the nose, appreciated for 
its own sake and not for its messages. More specifically, it 
is appreciated for its "quality," which means a culinary 
performance whereby (skill/art overcoming difficulty) the 
meal offers a positive difference from the normal meal. 
Normality and appreciation of the difference are cultur-
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ally determined, but the desire for the performance, and 
its appreciation, appear to be universal. In fact, aren't the 
same desire and appreciation at work when we pay to 
applaud an acrobat, a juggler, or a lion tamer, who (art/ 
skill overcoming difficulty) performs acts beyond our 
normal powers? In semiotic terms, any such perform-
ance, and all of them, may still be considered a sign, but 
autotelic, almost totally collapsed on itself, drawing atten-
tion to its signifier-i.e., what we see, hear, or taste. The 
signified only specifies that the particular signifier is in-
deed a performance-i.e., positively different in degree 
from normality. And the referent is that performance-i.e., 
the sign, i.e., mainly the signifier. Any other referential 
messages will come from the outside and through sec-
ondary signs. But then, isn't the primary sign at the center 
of circus? By means of costumes, varied messages can 
be grafted on the acrobatic act, which starts with the 
performance; without the performance, there would be no 
circus, only theater or pantomime. And again: does one 
communicate a performance? 
The questions raised by the circus prompt interest in 
other types of public "shows" which value performances 
and hence draw attention to the signifier. One could at-
tempt to order them within that perspective. In theater, for 
example, despite some stress on the performance-
quality of acting, beauty of a face or figure, harmony or 
extravaganza of sets-the referential function of second-
ary signs dominates to the point that they are generally 
viewed as primary, and priority is given to the text. A 
one-person act, on the other hand, although it may use 
referential material, is mainly appreciated for the 
performance-not for the content of jokes but for the 
manner of their telling. The circus operates like a many-
people show: it stresses the performance but also con-
veys messages. Bouissac's book shows that these are 
subtle and concerted, and powerfully grounded in our 
culture. I am not sure, however, whether they really ac-
count for the success of the circus, or whether they play 
second fiddle to the sheer enjoyment of the performance. 
Michael Greenhalgh and Vincent Megaw, eds. Art in 
Society: Studies in Style, Culture, and Aesthetics. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1978, xiii + 350 pp. (cloth). 
Reviewed by Marie ·Jeanne (Monni) Adams 
Harvard University 
As befits a pub I ication on art this is a handsome book, 
with an attractive print layout, sprinkled with photo-
graphs, drawings, and graphs, firmly bound, and appro-
priately heavy but compact in the hand. How it weighs in 
as a contribution to the subject cannot be stated as a 
simple sum of its parts, for a few brilliant sections out-
weigh the whole. 
The title sweeps across a wide intellectual horizon, but 
in fact the twenty-two essays stay neatly within the 
bounds of art studied by anthropologists; that is, they 
concentrate on small-scale societies, living, dead, or dy-
ing. The contributions stem from a symposium on art and 
society, sponsored by the editors, held at Leicester Uni-
versity in early 1975, with the addition of three papers, all 
but one drawn from Brit!sh backgrounds. 
Few anthropologists focus their primary effort on visual 
art in the same way they might on ritual or oral tradition, 
and fewer art historians concentrate on the art of exotic 
peoples. The result is that ethnoart is a bit of everybody's 
business, and the inevitable resulting miscellany shows 
up clearly in this kind of book, which lacks a specific 
theme or regional focus and includes a philosopher, art 
historians, archaeologists, social anthropologists, 
museum ethnographers, and practicing artists who are 
teachers or collectors. 
The resulting range of viewpoints and topics may give 
this book, as the cover claims, a wide appeal, but their 
juxtaposition and the ensuing seesawing quality can in-
duce vertigo even in a tolerant reader. The extremes in 
levels of expression and research caliber that charac-
terize this compendium are illustrated by the first two 
selections. Philosopher of aesthetics Richard Wollheim 
offers a worthy if obscurely abstract admonition that 
gleams with fashionable terms as he dismisses the 
taxonomic or distinctive feature approach in favor of the 
"generative," for the proper analysis of art works. This is 
followed by the trivial statements of Michael Cardew, the 
potter who served as a craft development teacher in 
Nigeria, to the effect that pre! iterate art is comparable to 
the art of children and that "others" do not have our habit 
of conceptual thinking. The entire first section, with nine 
essays on appreciation and aesthetics-none longer 
than five pages-resembles a slightly awry Hungarian 
cake with several dark tasty layers interspersed with light, 
airy ones. The remaining longer articles are loosely 
grouped under two headings: Methodology and Stylistic 
Analysis (six pieces) and Some Ethnographic Samples 
